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Introduction
Against the predictions of the modern portfolio theory on potential benets from inter-
national equity market diversication (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; Levy and Sarnat,
1970; Solnik, 1974), investors actually hold a disproportionately small amount of foreign
equities. The evidence of lack of diversication, often referred to as "home equity bias", is
documented by many authors (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995, among
others).
Information asymmetry and investor hedging behavior have often been addressed by the
literature as potential determinants of home bias. The informational motive is presumably
the most appealing and intuitive explanation of the home bias puzzle: investors tend to
allocate their funds towards assets they are more familiar with (Coval and Moskowitz,1999;
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). The relevance of hedging uninsurable sources of risks, such
as ination risk, has also been widely investigated in the literature (Cooper and Kaplanis,
1994; Baxter and Jermann, 1997). In particular, when the Purchasing Power Parity does
not hold, the investor-consumer wants to hedge the risk entailed by consuming a bundle of
goods subject to a country-specic ination risk. If there is a positive correlation between
domestic ination and domestic asset returns there is scope for hedging the ination risk
through an appropriate long position in domestic assets. The same reasoning applies to the
possibility of exploiting ination-return covariances in a multinational setting by choosing
an optimal international portfolio allocation. A combination of these two factors, ination
hedging and information asymmetry, may potentially shed some light on the puzzling
evidence of international portfolios.
In this work we investigate how ination hedging and informational factors inuence
not only the choice between home and foreign assets but also the fraction of the foreign
portfolio invested in di¤erent countries. Considering bilateral portfolio holdings is indeed
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crucial when the objective is not justifying the home bias phenomenon but, more broadly,
understanding the determinants of investors portfolio choice. We claim that the hedging
motive might actually drive investorsdecisions but not be easily identiable in a dichotomic
home-foreign setting. In fact, many "familiarity" factors - hard to be captured - might
induce to overinvest domestically so hiding other relevant factors. At the same time,
eventual informational issues are more likely identiable when splitting the foreign portfolio
into its country components.
We depart, on the one hand, from Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) approach in the sense
that we test the ination hedging motive on the overall international portfolio rather than
on domestic investments only. On the other hand, we generalize the recent empirical work
on international equity portfolios (Ahearne et al., 2004; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008)
accounting also for the ination risk. Our ndings conrm, in a multinational setting,
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) result of no ination hedging motive and evidence a crucial
role for nancial market development and trade linkages in driving international portfolio
choice.
The paper is structured as follows. In the rst section we briey review the theoretical
and empirical literature on home bias and equity portfolio investments. In the second
section we build the theoretical framework. In the third section we describe the data.
The fourth section denes the variables and concludes with some key descriptive statistics.
In the fth section we dene the econometric setting. In the sixth section we show the
empirical results. The seventh section nally concludes.
1 Literature review
Until very recently, the empirical work on international portfolio allocation has almost
coincided, due to bilateral data limitations, with the research on home bias. Even though
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our paper does not deal explicitly with the home bias puzzle, it is worth summarizing here
the major contributions to this literature. Since the seminal paper by French and Poterba
(1991) much work has been done in order to explain the so-called equity home bias
puzzle, that is the bias towards domestic assets observed in international stock portfolios.
The candidate explanations proposed by the literature can be broadly grouped into those
focusing on institutional factors and those focusing on investorsbehavior1.
The strand of literature based on institutional factors is also the earliest (Black, 1974;
Stulz, 1981; Tesar and Werner, 1995). It tries to explain the lack of portfolio diversication
through the existence of barriers to international investment such as restrictions on inter-
national capital ows, withholding taxes and transaction costs. However, the relaxation of
capital controls which occurred over the last decades has not signicantly induced a parallel
drop in home bias pointing to the inadequacy of the institutional explanation. Since then
a new strand of literature centered on investors behavior emerged, giving rise to three
di¤erent approaches: the sentiment-based explanation, the risk hedging explanation and
nally the information asymmetry explanation.
French and Poterba (1991), spousing the sentiment-based approach, suggest that in-
vestors may simply be relatively more optimistic about their domestic markets. This
assertion is empirically supported by Strong and Xu (2003) and Li (2004) showing that
fund managers or investors in general are more optimistic about their home stock market.
This approach, however, just tautologically asserts that investors choose a given portfo-
lio allocation because they like it more than other feasible allocations, not providing any
rational explanation for this behavior.
The second approach is focused on the investors behavior aimed at hedging specic
sources of risk such as ination (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994) or risks deriving from non
1See Lewis (1999) for a detailed survey on equity home bias.
4
tradable assets such as labor income (Tesar, 1993; Baxter and Jermann, 1997; Baxter et al.,
1998; Coen, 2001; Pesenti and van Wincoop, 2002). Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), build-
ing on the Adler and Dumas (1983) model, develop a theoretical framework integrating
ination risk and deadweight costs. They conclude that home bias cannot be explained by
ination hedging2 unless investors are characterized by unlikely low levels of risk aversion.
Coen (2001), extending the Adler and Dumas (1983) model to integrate human capital risk,
also nds that home bias cannot be explained by either ination or labor income hedging
motives. Other contributions are more focused on the omission of a non-traded asset in
the portfolio. Tesar (1993) shows that consumers intertemporal preferences over traded
and non-traded goods may skew portfolios towards claims on domestic output. Baxter
and Jermann (1997), considering the implications of non-traded human capital for portfo-
lio composition, nd results that deepen the home bias puzzle instead of solving it. They
show, indeed, that returns to human and physical capital are very highly correlated so that
hedging the risk associated with human capital should involve a short position in national
equities. Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) investigate to what extent non-tradables - con-
sumption and leisure - can a¤ect the portfolio allocation decision in otherwise integrated
capital markets. They nd that hedging against non-tradables shocks can account for only
a small portfolio bias toward domestic assets.
Finally, the third approach is centered on information asymmetries faced by investors
and represents probably the most prolic literature on home bias (Gehrig, 1993; Kang and
Stulz, 1994; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Pagano et al., 2002; Portes and Rey, 2005). Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980) in a fundamental paper assert the impossibility of informationally
e¢ cient markets: as information is costly, price cannot perfectly reect all available infor-
mation otherwise there would be no market compensation in spending resources to obtain
2The ination hedging motive in portfolio choice shoud induce higher investment in stocks whose return
is more highly correlated with home ination in order to minimize the ination risk.
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information. This paper opened the way to a series of theoretical works addressing the
informational asymmetry motive as the major cause of the observed portfolio allocations.
Gehrig (1993) derives a simple noisy rational expectations model where, even in equi-
librium, investors remain incompletely informed and may on average be better informed
about the risk characteristics of domestic stocks. Hence, foreign investments appear, on
average, more risky and investors rationally skew their portfolios towards the less risky
domestic assets. Empirical support to the informational asymmetry motive comes from
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) who nd in the US and
Finland, respectively, the preference of investors for local rms. Similarly, Kang and Stulz
(1997) nd out that foreign investors overweight shares of large rms and of rms with
good accounting performance, providing further support for the information asymmetry
explanation.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 General ICAPM: ination hedging
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), building on the Adler and Dumas (1983) model, consider
how far the observed positions in domestic assets can be explained by ination hedging
motives. Their results reject the hypothesis of ination hedging as justication of the
disproportionate domestic investment: the joint hypothesis of a positive coe¢ cient of risk
aversion and a positive correlation between domestic return and ination is strongly re-
jected. This outcome conrms the very early critique by Lintner (1975) and Fama and
Schwert (1977) assessing the inadequacy of equities to hedge the ination risk.
We claim that the hedging motive might actually drive investorsdecisions although it
might be hidden by familiarity factors in a home-foreign setting. By allowing for bilateral
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stock positions in several foreign countries we might be able to disclose it. We model the
ination risk in the investors problem following the Adler and Dumas (1983) International
Capital Asset Pricing Model. We consider L investors investing in N stocks and one
risk-free asset3. Lacking data on the specic securities exchanged between individuals,
we assume that investors are restricted to hold national market indexes. Consequently,
considering one investor and one asset per country, we deal with L source countries and
N host countries. Hence, the vector of weights will have dimension (N + 1)x1 while the
variance-covariance matrix of returns will have dimension NxN since the (N + 1)th asset
is riskless. All variables are expressed in a common currency chosen as numeraire4.
The investors constrained optimization problem is the following
Max
wj
E
Z T
t
V (C;P; s)ds (1)
sub dW =
24 NX
j=1
wj(j   r) + r
35Wdt  Cdt+ NX
j=1
wjjdzj (2)
whereW is the nominal wealth, j is the instantaneous expected rate of return, r is the
riskless instantaneous nominal interest rate, j is the instantaneous standard deviation, C is
the nominal rate of consumption, P is the price level index, V - expressing the instantaneous
rate of indirect utility - is a function homogeneous of degree zero in (C;P ) and w is the
vector of investors portfolio shares.
The instantaneous total rate of return on the market portfolio of country j is
3As shown by Solnik (1974) and Sercu (1980), currency risk is hedged through bonds exclusively. We,
therefore, consider the optimal risky portfolio made up only by equities implicitly assuming that investors
hedge these stocks through an optimal combination of home and foreign bonds (Cooper and Kaplanis,
1994).
4As shown by Solnik (1974) and Sercu (1980), the portfolio composition is independent from the nu-
meraire considered.
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dYj=Yj = jdt+ jdzj
where zj is a Wiener process and dzj is a standard Gauss Wiener process with zero
mean.
The price index of investor l in the measurement currency follows the Brownian process
dPl=Pl = ldt+ l;dzl;
where l is the expected value of the instantaneous rate of ination and l; is the
standard deviation of the instantaneous rate of ination.
Denoting by J(W;P; t) the maximum value of (1) subject to (2), we dene by  the
investors relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
 =  JWW
JW
W
where JW and JWW are, respectively, the rst and second partial derivative of J(:)
with respect to W .
This yields the optimal solution
j = r + (1  )j; + 
PN
k=1wkj;k
and the vector of optimal portfolio shares is given by
~wl =
1

0B@ 
 1(  ri)
1  i0
 1(  ri)
1CA+ (1  1)
0B@ 
 1$l
1  i0
 1$l
1CA (3)
where i denotes a Nx1 vector of ones, 
 is a NxN matrix of instantaneous variances-
covariances of nominal rates of returns and $l is a Nx1 vector of covariances between
nominal asset returns and country ls rate of ination. The last element in each vector
refers to the riskless asset. The rst term in parentheses of the above equilibrium condition
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is often called "logarithm portfolio"5, that is the portfolio driven by excess return and
variance-covariance considerations, while the second is the "hedge portfolio", that is the
portfolio hedging the investors ination risk.
The vector of weights in the investor ls equity portfolio is then
wl = 

 1  1
([  ri] +
 
1  1

[$l]
	
(4)
2.2 General ICAPM: ination hedging and information asymmetries
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) use the return reduction approach that is the most reasonable
way of modelling direct transaction costs. However, since recent literature (Ahearne et al.,
2004; Berkel, 2004) has documented the failure of the direct costsexplanation, we focus
on "indirect" costs, i.e. information asymmetries which are integrated in the model fol-
lowing the Gehrig (1993) approach. The informational barriers are assumed to modify the
variance-covariance matrix in such a way that foreign investors perceive a higher variance
of the asset issued by country k than the investor residing in country k6.
In particular we assume that each investor has a perceived variance about foreign
assets that is increased by the associated information costs while no information costs are
associated to home investments.
For each investor l the vector of equity portfolio shares, Sl; will be
Sl = C
 1
l 

 1  1
(  ri) +
 
1  1

$l

(5)
5 It is the portfolio held by the investor characterized by a unitary coe¢ cient of risk aversion, i.e. a
logarithmic utility function.
6 In a standard setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), an informed investor
has a lower perceived variance due to her private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected return
is generally di¤erent from the uninformed investors. This implies that a "foreign-bias" should sometimes
be observed when the domestic investor notices bad signals. Our perspective on information asymmetry is,
instead, closer to the concept of "model uncertainty" or "Knightian uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao, 2003;
Uppal and Wang, 2003). Roughly speaking, we assume that the foreign investors perceived uncertainty is
higher than the domestic investors one, though both face the same perceived return.
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Cl =
266666666664
(1 + cl1) 0       0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . (1 + clj)
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0       0 (1 + clN )
377777777775
where Cl is a NxN diagonal positive denite matrix and clj is the bilateral cost of asset
j borne by country ls investor. As it is hard to nd an empirical counterpart for bilateral
costs, clj is often decomposed into two parts: the outward cost (cl), i.e. the cost faced
by an investor to transfer funds out of her own country l, and the inward cost (cj), i.e.
the cost faced by an investor to entercountry j:
(1 + clj) = f((1 + cl); (1 + cj)) (6)
As (1 + clj) stands for the informational asymmetry cost between country l and j,
its reciprocal
1
1 + clj
captures the informational e¢ ciency between country l and country
j. In this setting the minimum value taken by (1 + clj) is 1 and corresponds to the full
information case, that is the case in which investor l invests in domestic assets (cll = 0). If
clj = 0 for any (l; j) pair then Cl = C
 1
l = I and we return to the usual formulation (4)
without information costs.
The equilibrium condition on stock market j ensures that the equilibrium stock return
equates the overall demand for stock j to its supply, that is its market capitalization. The
demand for asset j depends on the aggregate demand for the "logarithm portfolio" - the
demand driven by excess returns and variance-covariance considerations - and on the ag-
gregate demand for the "hedge portfolio" - the demand driven by ination hedging motives.
After dividing both sides of our equilibrium condition by the total world capitalization the
equilibrium condition becomes
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MS = 
 1
"
1
(  ri) +
 
1  1
 LX
l=1
MSl$l
#
(7)
In the above expression,  is a NxN diagonal matrix and the generic element j on the
diagonal is the average informational e¢ ciency of asset j (j =
PL
l=1MSl
1
1 + clj
)7. When
the bilateral information cost is split into source country-specic cost and host country-
specic cost, as specied above, j can be expressed as
j = f(
LX
l=1;
l 6=j
MSl
1
1 + cl
+MSj ; (1 MSj) 1
1 + cj
+MSj) (8)
Let us dene Dl = Cl (where Dl is again a diagonal matrix). We can rewrite expres-
sion (5) as
Sl = D
 1
l 

 1  1
(  ri) +
 
1  1

$l

(9)
where Dlj = jClj and
1
Dlj
=
1
1+clj
j
Now, substituting the equilibrium condition (7) into (9) we get the following result
Sl = D
 1
l MS+
 
1  1

C 1l 

 1
 
$l  
LX
l=1
MSl$l
!
(10)
We can now observe how the covariance vector in parentheses pre-multiplied by the
inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of returns is a vector of regression coe¢ cients
(Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994).
7To compute the average informational e¢ ciency we proxy country ls share of world wealth by MSl, i.e.
country ls share in the world stock market capitalization (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994). Also to compute
the weighted average return-ination covariance vector (
PL
l=1MSl$l) each investing country l is weighted
by MSl to proxy country ls share of world wealth corrected by country ls relative (to world average)
informational advantage.
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 1
 
$l  
LX
l=1
MSl$l
!
= bl 
0BBBBBBBBBB@
bl1
...
blj
...
blN
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(11)
If we dene by pl the ination rate of country l then
PL
l=1MSl$l is the average world
ination rate and bl turns out to be the vector of coe¢ cients of the multiple regression of
(pl  
PL
l=1MSlpl) on the vector of nominal returns. The regression coe¢ cient bl reects
how far the returns can explain the deviation of investor ls ination rate from the average
ination. The variation of the ination rate constitutes a factor of risk the investor wants
to hedge through optimal investment in risky assets. The higher the correlation of stock
js return with the deviation of country ls ination from the average, the higher the share
of country js assets held by country l, since stock j is a good hedge against ination risk.
3 Data
In our analysis we use two datasets in order to exploit both the cross-sectional and the
time dimension8: the US-based panel (Survey of Current Business) and the pooled CPIS
(IMF ). The choice of considering the pooled CPIS dataset is motivated by the objective of
enlarging the analysis from a US-based perspective to a wider set of investing countries. At
the same time, due to the limited time dimension of the CPIS dataset, available only for 3
non consecutive years, we chose to adopt also the US-panel dataset which is available for
8Both surveys collect and security-level data from the major custodians and large end-investors. The
dataset of US holdings of foreign equities is available at www.bea.gov/scb/index.htm. The CPIS dataset is
available at www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
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a longer, though still limited, time span (9 years). The joint analysis of the pooled CPIS
and the US-panel should make our ndings more general and comparable to the existing
empirical literature adopting either of the two datasets.
The rst dataset is a US-based (unbalanced) panel of 17 countries for 9 years (1994-
2002) for a total of 153 observations. It is drawn from di¤erent issues of the Survey of
Current Business (1996-2004)9.
The second dataset is a pooled dataset of 13 investing countries. The rst CPIS con-
ducted by IMF was relative to the end-1997 period and since 2001 this survey has been
released annually. The CPIS provides a unique perspective on cross-country bilateral eq-
uity positions enabling the implementation of empirical analysis on international portfolio
allocation for a large set of investing countries. We consider in this work the rst three
editions, 1997, 2001 and 2002. Unlike other papers using the same dataset (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), we choose to limit the analysis to a subset of the countries partici-
pating in the survey. We selected them on the basis of their nancial and, more broadly,
economic importance. Moreover, since our theoretical model predicts all non zero weights,
we made a choice of source and host countries so as to have non zero holdings for all coun-
tries included10. By pooling together the 1997-2001-2002 databases, we obtain about 900
observations (13 source countries, 23 host countries, 3 years)11.
As far as regressors are concerned, to estimate the ination hedging coe¢ cients we de-
9The host countries are: Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
10Alternatively, some authors prefer to include all investing and destination countries and run a Tobit
regression, accounting also for zero portfolio holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008).
11The investing countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Germany and Switzer-
land are not among the investing countries since they did not participate in the 1997 survey. The host
countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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rived the stock returns from Datastream-Thomson Financials and the ination rates from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS ). To construct the proxies for information e¢ -
ciency we derived Gross Domestic Product, Population size and Trade Flows from IFS and
OECD National Accounts and M3 monetary aggregate and Stock Market Capitalization
from Datastream-Thomson Financials.
4 Variables denition and descriptive statistics
4.1 Variables denition
4.1.1 Dependent variable: portfolio shares
The datasets adopted contain information on foreign holdings only and do not include
domestic positions. In order to derive the dependent variable in our analysis we need to
retrieve the share of foreign assets. To accomplish this objective we drew from the Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS ) the outstanding foreign equity portfolio investments and
the corresponding liabilities and then derived the foreign share, FS12
FSi;t =
(FA)i;t
(MCAPi;t + FAi;t   FLi;t) (12)
FA stands for "foreign equity assets", FL for "foreign equity liabilities" andMCAP for
"stock market capitalization". After obtaining the foreign share FS it is possible to recover
the share of each foreign asset in the overall portfolio.
12Baele et al. (2004) and Sorensen et al. (2008) follow the same procedure dealing with the CPIS dataset.
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4.1.2 Regressors: Information asymmetry variables
Since the information asymmetries are not directly observable, in the empirical implemen-
tation we have to make use of proxies. The suggested proxies indicate the reciprocal of
information cost, i.e. information e¢ ciency. We consider six alternatives to proxy infor-
mation e¢ ciency.
The rst three variables can be labeled as "size" proxies, i.e. proxies referred to the size
of the source and host country. The rst proxy is the (logarithm of) Gross Domestic Prod-
uct per capita (log(GDP=POP )). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), among others, consider
this variable as a broad indicator of market e¢ ciency. The second proxy, the M3 mone-
tary aggregate over GDP (M3=GDP ); is meant to capture nancial market e¢ ciency13.
The third proxy, more directly linked to stock market, is the market capitalization over
GDP (MCAP=GDP ) and associates the size of stock market capitalization to e¢ ciency
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). This measure of nancial development has been linked
to economic growth (Beck et al., 2000) and access to external nance (Rajan and Zingales,
1998).
The last three variables can be labelled as "trade" proxies as they are proxies related to
trade linkages between source and host countries. In particular, they are connected with in-
ternational trade ows (imports and exports) and imply a sort of information spillover from
the goods market to the stock market. The "openness measure" ((IMP + EXP )=GDP )
has been heavily adopted in the literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Ahearne et al.,
2004), the basic intuition being that trade ows may have informational content relative to
nancial markets. Portes and Rey (2005) nd that the distance is a time-invariant proxy for
13Either the credit to private sector or M2 (Berkel, 2004) are usually adopted as indicators of development
of the nancial sector. Since both the credit to private sector and the M2 monetary aggregate were not
available for all countries and years considered in our sample, we chose the M3 monetary aggregate. Anyway,
in support of our choice, it is worth noticing that a larger monetary aggregate should better capture the
degree of sophistication of the nancial sector.
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information barriers driving equity ows. Since "gravity" models in trade literature show
that trade ows are strongly correlated with distance, we expect trade ows to capture
information factors with the notable advantage of being time-varying. The idea of captur-
ing the separate impact of the two components, imports (IMP ) and exports (EXP ), is
stimulated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). They analyze the CPIS 2001 issue nding
no role for exports in explaining portfolio holdings, thus conjecturing that the signicant
e¤ect of imports was due to risk-sharing reasons rather than to informational motives14.
Results evidencing a signicant impact of exports on portfolio holdings would then support
the informational motive.
It is now worth making a technical point. As anticipated in the theoretical section,
the bilateral informational proxy is constructed as a function of source and host country
variables (6). To provide some robustness to our results, the functional form combining
the country-specic variables can be additive or multiplicative, as explained in detail in the
Appendix. Furthermore, these bilateral informational proxies enter the regression analysis
in a transformed fashion in order to normalize to zero the lower bound of informational
costs corresponding to domestic investments. To this purpose, the original variable is
divided by one plus itself so that the informational e¢ ciency of domestic investment tends
to one as informational costs tend to zero15. This normalization procedure allows to make
all proxies, potentially di¤erent in size, directly comparable, so that a di¤erent magnitude
in regression coe¢ cients reects their di¤erent explanatory power.
14See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for further details on the role of imports in portfolio allocation
decisions. Note that, in a companion paper (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), they spouse the informational
motive to account for the strong linkages between bilateral trade in goods and bilateral equity holdings.
15See Appendix A for further technical details.
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4.1.3 Regressors: Ination hedging coe¢ cients
The ination hedging coe¢ cient bl in (11) is estimated by regressing the deviation of
country ls ination rate from the world average ination on stock returns.
(pl  
LX
l=1
MSlpl)t = bl0 +
JX
j=1
bljRlj;t + "ljt (13)
Following Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), we instrument return Rlj;t by its lagged value
Rlj;t 1 where the orthogonality condition E(Rlj;t 1"ljt) = 0 holds. A GMM regression is,
therefore, implemented returning consistent estimates of the blj coe¢ cients.
To estimate the above expression we use monthly data for the 5 years previous to the
date in which portfolio holdings are reported. Accordingly, for 1994-stock holdings in the
US panel, we use the nominal returns for the period January 1990-December 1994, while
for 1995 portfolio positions we refer to the January 1991-December 1995 period. Cooper
and Kaplanis (1994) consider a unique portfolio position at the end of 1987 and consider
the returns for the period January 1978-December 1987. To estimate the coe¢ cients they
use a number of observations twice as large as ours, implicitly assuming that the relation
ination-returns is stable for such a long period. We instead do not rely so much on
the stability of this relationship especially for the more recent years in our sample period
since stock markets experienced periods of instability. We therefore give up the inferential
advantages of a larger sample limiting our analysis to the ve preceding years. It is worth
stressing that the choice made by Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) was driven by the fact that
their explicit objective was making inference on the domestic ination hedging coe¢ cient,
while in our analysis the hedging coe¢ cients represent only an intermediate step toward
our nal purposes.
17
4.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics relative to portfolio shares and stock mar-
ket shares of CPIS investing countries. In column 1 we show the stock market share of
the investing country, in column 2 the domestic investment and in column 3 the overall
investment in the 23 countries within the opportunity set. A comparison between column
2 and column 1 immediately shows that all countries considered display a strong home bias
towards domestic assets: Austria appears to be the only country investing less than half of
its portfolio in domestic assets. Looking at the third column we notice that the included
destination countries, which represent about 94% of the world stock market capitalization,
cover almost the overall portfolio investment of the 13 countries analyzed so stressing the
negligible investment in emerging markets16.
Table 2 reports the key descriptive statistics of the variables adopted to construct the
proxies of informational e¢ ciency, distinguishing between source and host countries. The
reported variables show a standard deviation across source and host countries ranging from
0.10 to 0.15. It reects a noticeable variability since it represents, depending on the con-
sidered proxy, from one-fourth to one-half of the mean value taken by the variable. The
only exception is the logarithm of per capita gross domestic product showing a standard
deviation lower than 0.01 and a mean value from two to four times larger than the other
variables. The remarkable di¤erence in variability is attributable to the logarithmic trans-
formation making observations closer on a cardinal basis. However, as stated above, all
variables enter the regression properly transformed (see Appendix A) to be consistent with
a zero information cost relative to domestic assets, so that all proxies are made comparable
and the logarithmic transformation does not represent an issue.
16The last row of column 3 reports the portfolio share (0.981) invested by the US within the CPIS dataset
(23 countries). The corresponding value in the US panel dataset (17 countries) is 0.976, very close to the
gure reported here.
18
5 Econometric setting
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), who aimed at nding a justication for the home bias puzzle,
limited their statistical analysis to the test of the bll coe¢ cient, that is the ination hedging
coe¢ cient relative to domestic holdings. Our objective is, instead, to test the role of
ination hedging in explaining international portfolio choice. To this purpose, we plug the
ination hedging coe¢ cients estimated according to (13) into the equilibrium condition
(10) which can be rewritten as17
Sl = D
 1
l MS+
 
1  1

C 1l b (14)
or in terms of individual asset
Slj =
1
Dlj
MSj +
 
1  1
 1
Clj
blj (15)
It can be noticed that the information e¢ ciency factor enters our equation in a non
linear way. How country js market share determines the demand for asset j depends on
the information e¢ ciency of investor l relative to the average18. Investor l; for the fraction
of her portfolio related to equity returns and variance, the "logarithm portfolio", will hold
a share of assets greater (or smaller) than the market share in proportion to 1Dlj (inverse
of relative information asymmetry cost). As far as the "hedge portfolio" is concerned, the
country js share in investor ls portfolio is determined by the ination hedging properties of
the considered stock blj , proportionally to 1Clj (inverse of absolute information asymmetry
17Note that the errors of the main regression need not be adjusted for the inclusion of the estimated b.
In fact, we are not replacing a population variable with its estimate, as the variable in (11) is the estimated
coe¢ cient not the population one.
18As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001) the share of country js equity held by country l is a decreasing
(increasing) function of the bilateral trading cost (e¢ ciency) between l and j relative to the average trading
costs between country j and all other countries.
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cost):
We substitute the dependent variable Slj with the observed actual country shares
ACSlj
19
ACSlj;t = q0 + q1Slj;t + {lj;t
Finally, our estimable equation will be20
ACSlj;t = a0 + 1MSj;t + 2blj;t + 3prlj;t + 4r_prlj;t ++lj;t (16)
where prlj is the proxy of absolute information e¢ ciency between country l and j, while
r_prlj is the proxy of relative (to world average) information e¢ ciency between country l
and j:
The proxy, by denition, captures the unobservable variable with a measurement er-
ror. This error makes the proxy included in the regression correlated with the regression
disturbance thus invalidating any coe¢ cient estimates. To ensure the necessary orthogo-
nality condition between the error and the regressors we instrument the proxy by its lagged
value. For both datasets, we implement an Instrumental Variable (IV ) regression: a Panel
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS ) regression is run for the US panel dataset and a Pooled
IV-2SLS regression is implemented for the CPIS pooled dataset. In the inference analysis
we consider White cross-section covariances, robust to cross-correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity. In the US panel dataset we account for the period xed e¤ect, removing the period
specic mean from the dependent variable and the exogenous regressors, performing the
19Note that the possibility of measurement error in the dependent variable does not cause any endogeneity
problem, as it totally translates into the regression disturbance.
20Although the model is non linear in the relevant variables, we chose to estimate a linear regression
model. We are interested, in fact, in nding out the individual coe¢ cient relative to each regressor rather
than the one related to the interaction of two variables as it would not allow to disentangle the separate
e¤ects. Furthermore, since we are adopting proxies of information e¢ ciency, our objective is to pick up the
sign of the relevant coe¢ cients rather than their exact size.
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specied regression on the demeaned data. Similarly, we include a time dummy in the
pooled dataset so as to account for the period e¤ect.
We expect a positive sign for the coe¢ cient of MSj21 and a positive sign for the
coe¢ cient of informational proxies; indeed, the higher the information e¢ ciency between
country l and country j, the higher the observed share of asset j in country ls portfolio
should be. We expect a positive sign also for ^2, the estimated coe¢ cient of the ination
hedging factor: the higher the investor ls ination response to stock j return (i.e. the
e¤ectiveness of ination hedging of stock j), the higher the demand for stock j will be.
We consider two alternative ways of constructing the proxy of the bilateral e¢ ciency
factor, the additive one and the multiplicative one. These alternative functional specica-
tions, di¤erently combining source country and host country variables, allow us to check
the robustness of our results22.
6 Results
In Table 3 we report a summary of the results of the ination hedging regression (13). We
show for each destination asset j its average value bj , that is the average, over all investing
countries l; of the blj coe¢ cients obtained as estimates from the regression (13). From this
table we can infer the ination hedging properties of each stock. A positive mean for bj
implies that, on average, asset j is a good hedge against ination and so investors should go
long on it to hedge ination risk. Irish stocks, for instance, which show the higher positive
hedging coe¢ cient (0.219), should be held on average to hedge ination (0.068). On the
contrary, the German market, which shows the higher negative ination hedging coe¢ cient
21Note that, for each year in our sample, portfolio positions refer to December, 31st while the market
shares refer to December, 28th in order to avoid endogeneity due to simultaneous equations. We have also
run regressions instrumenting MSj with its lagged value obtaining very similar results.
22See Appendix A for details on the cost/e¢ ciency function specications.
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(-0.182), should be shorted, on average, for ination hedging purposes (-0.054). It is worth
noticing that for each stock j the minimum value of the blj coe¢ cients is always negative,
meaning that at least one country should go short on asset j, and the maximum is always
positive, meaning that at least one country should go long on asset j. It implies that there
is no stock asset that should be held or shorted by all investors to hedge ination.
We use the coe¢ cients derived from the ination hedging regression to estimate the
coe¢ cients in the main regression. In Table 4 and 5 we report the results when the cost
function is additive, while in Table 6 and 7 we report the results when the cost function is
multiplicative. Table 4 and 6 show results, under di¤erent cost specications, adopting the
"size" proxies, while Tables 5 and 7 adopt the "trade" proxies. Odd-numbered columns in
each table refer to the US panel while even-numbered columns refer to the CPIS dataset.
As predicted by ICAPM models, we nd a positive coe¢ cient for MSj , the market
share of the host country: the higher is the market share country j the higher is, ceteris
paribus, the investment in that country23. When considering the ination hedging factor,
on the contrary, we nd that the estimated coe¢ cients do not match those predicted by
the theory. For the CPIS dataset, under all specications, the coe¢ cient is either positive
non signicant or negative signicant. These ndings point to a rejection of the ination
hedging motive as determinant of international portfolio allocation. For the US panel the
picture is less neat: under both cost function specications, when the proxies adopted are
either the GDP per capita or the ratio market capitalization to GDP, the coe¢ cient for blj
is positive and statistically signicant, being equal to 0.036 and 0.083 for GDP/POP and
MCAP/GDP, respectively. In terms of economic signicance, it means that if a stock j has
an ination hedging factor larger than stock k by one unit, it translates into a higher share
23There is one single case in which the coe¢ cient on MSj is negative. This is the case in which the
Gross Domestic Product per capita is adopted as proxy in the US panel with the additive cost function
specication (Table 4, column 1). As motivated later, GDP/POP turns out to be a not reliable proxy of
information asymmetry.
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in the US portfolio by almost 4 percentage points when GDP/POP is used as proxy and
by more than 8 percentage points when MCAP/GDP is used as informational proxy. This
evidence suggests that, at least for the US, portfolio investment might be partially explained
by ination hedging motives as long as the two "size" variables are accepted as reliable
e¢ ciency proxies. However, when considering the US panel dataset, we have to take into
account that the variability of the "constructed" bilateral proxy is mainly due to the cross-
sectional variation of the host country variable since the adopted proxies are, per se, quite
persistent. It may therefore be the case that some of the "constructed" bilateral proxies
capture host country specic variables rather than bilateral specic variables, making the
multicollinearity with the regressor MSj a serious issue. Indeed, the correlation between
the prlj constructed over the log(GDP=POP ) proxy andMSj is about 0.924. This problem
can be also evidenced considering the coe¢ cient of MSj when the proxy adopted is the
log(GDP=POP ): For the US panel dataset, the coe¢ cient for MSj is always positive,
statistically signicant and larger than 0.7 except when the GDP per capita is adopted as
informational proxy (Table 4, column 1). In this case, the coe¢ cient on MSj is negative,
although non signicant, suggesting that the coe¢ cient on the proxy might be actually
capturing, at least partially, the e¤ect of the market share on portfolio investments25 This
evidence casts some doubts on the adoption of the GDP per capita as proxy, at least for
the US panel. The ination hedging motive is therefore not rejected only if the US is
the investing country and MCAP/GDP is the proxy. In all other cases, there is evidence
against the ination hedging motive as determinant of international portfolio investment
that generally conrms - in a multinational setting - the Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)
24The other proxies seem to be more reliable since their correlation with MSj is below 0.6. The multi-
collinearity of the informational proxies with MSj is not an issue, instead, for the pooled CPIS dataset.
The presence of many investing countries, in fact, ensures that the variability of the "constructed" bilateral
proxy depends also on the investing side so determining a lower correlation with MSj .
25Note that also in Table 6, where the proxy is GDP/POP but the cost function is multiplicative, the
coe¢ cient of MSj is small and non signicant, although positive.
23
ndings.
When considering the coe¢ cients of the proxies we have to make some general remarks.
First of all, the proxiescoe¢ cients display all the expected positive sign, with the exception
of the coe¢ cient of EXP=GDP in the US panel with additive cost function (Table 5,
column 5). Secondly, there are some notable di¤erences between the CPIS pooled dataset
and the US panel dataset. For CPIS we observe robust and statistically signicant results
for all the informational proxies considered, except for the GDP/POP proxy for which
the coe¢ cient of the relative proxy (r_pr) is positive but non statistically signicant26.
On the contrary, for the US panel we can identify only a subset of reliable proxies. As
already mentioned, the GDP per capita is a critical proxy as revealed by the negative
coe¢ cient on MSj . Also the M3/GDP proxy should be handled with caution. In fact, it
shows a non signicant coe¢ cient for the relative proxy variable (Table 4, column 3) in the
additive cost function case while it shows a low and non signicant coe¢ cient for MSj in
the multiplicative cost function specication (Table 6, column 3). As shown in Tables 5
and 7, also the EXP/GDP appears to be a critical proxy in the US panel: the coe¢ cient of
the absolute proxy (pr) is indeed negative and signicant when the additive cost function
is adopted. To sum up, the proxies fully reliable for the US panel dataset are the market
capitalization per GDP, the openness measure and the import to GDP ratio, while for the
CPIS all proxies with the exception of GDP/POP can be considered reliable.
The size of proxiescoe¢ cients is not very informative and hardly interpretable because
of the very nature of the proxies, aimed at capturing the direction of the latent variable
rather than the exact size of its impact. This issue is particularly relevant in our setting
since we do not deal simply with a proxy variable capturing a latent variable but with
a "constructed" bilateral proxy variable which is, in turn, a function of proxy variables.
26Note that this evidence makes the adoption of the GDP/POP proxy critical also for the CPIS dataset.
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This inevitably makes even less immediate the interpretation of the size of the proxy
coe¢ cient in terms of the e¤ect of the latent variable on the dependent variable. However,
by comparing the size of the signicant coe¢ cients across di¤erent proxies we can at least
infer their relative economic impact on portfolio investments. We will ignore throughout
the analysis the GDP/POP variable since, as noted above, it seems to be a critical proxy
for both datasets, and will focus on the other proxies. When comparing the additive cost
function to the multiplicative one it seems evident that the coe¢ cients sign does not
depend on the cost function specication while the coe¢ cientssize does. The coe¢ cients
of the absolute proxies (pr) are, indeed, smaller in the additive cost function case than in
the multiplicative one whereas the opposite holds for the coe¢ cients of the relative proxies
(r_pr).
Before proceeding with the analysis it is worth stressing the di¤erent role of the absolute
and relative informational e¢ ciency factor. The pr is aimed at capturing the informational
e¢ ciency factor which enters the equilibrium condition multiplied by the ination hedging
factor, while the r_pr captures the informational e¢ ciency relative to the world average
and enters the equilibrium condition multiplied by the market share of the destination
asset. In this work we nd a very limited role for the ination hedging motive, restricted
to the case of the MCAP/GDP proxy in the US panel dataset. In this unique case we
have to take into account the size of the coe¢ cients of both pr and r_pr: For both cost
specications, we nd that the impact of the absolute proxy pr, i.e. of the proxy operating
through the ination hedging motive, is stronger than the impact of r_pr: it is twice
as large in the additive case and ten times larger in the multiplicative case. For the
other cases analyzed, however, we uncover no role for the ination hedging factor so that
only the relative proxy (r_pr) plays a role in determining portfolio allocations. In other
words, only MSj and the relative informational e¢ ciency proxy (r_pr) matter in shaping
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international equity portfolios. Restricting to reliable proxies for the two datasets, we
nd, comfortingly, that the relative impact of the di¤erent r_pr adopted does not depend
on the cost function specication. As far as the "size" proxies are concerned there is no
possibility of comparability across proxies in the US panel, since the only reliable proxy is
the MCAP/GDP. In the CPIS dataset, instead, the impact of the M3/GDP factor is larger
than the impact of the MCAP/GDP in both specications and thus determines a stronger
e¤ect of the sophistication of nancial market on international portfolio allocation. As for
the "trade" variables, the impact of the openness measure is larger than the impact of
the IMP/GDP in the US panel under both cost specications. A similar pattern can be
found in the CPIS dataset: the coe¢ cient of the openness measure is the largest one and
the coe¢ cient relative to the EXP/GDP ratio is the smallest one, regardless of the cost
specication adopted.
The ndings of this paper are consistent with the recent empirical literature as we nd
strong evidence that the information asymmetry motive leads equity portfolio composition.
In particular, our results point to the importance of nancial market development and trade
linkages. However, in contrast with Ahearne et al. (2004), we nd a role for US import
ows in explaining foreign portfolio holdings; also, di¤erently from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008), we nd that both imports and exports play a role in explaining portfolio positions
for large investing countries, except for the US27. Finally, in contrast with the theory and
in line with Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), our results nd no robust support for the ination
hedging motive also when bilateral foreign investments are taken into account.
27 It is worth pointing out that we use a di¤erent US-based dataset than Ahearne et al. (2004) since they
use a cross-country dataset while we use a panel dataset. Also the dataset used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) does not coincide with ours. They, in fact, use all investing and destination countries in the 2001
CPIS release while we use only major investing countries and a selected sample of destination countries for
the years 1997-2001-2002.
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7 Summary and conclusions
We derived a theoretical variation of the original Adler and Dumas (1983) portfolio allo-
cation model including information asymmetries. We investigated, within this theoretical
framework, the role of ination hedging and information asymmetries using a regression
approach rather than a test-based approach as in Cooper and Kaplanis (1994). We nd
evidence, in a bilateral setting, of a general rejection of the ination hedging motive as
suggested in a home-foreign dimension by Cooper and Kaplanis (1994). This result is,
however, even more drastic: it suggests not only that home bias cannot be explained by
ination hedging but, more generally, that investors do not consider stocks as valid in-
struments to hedge ination. This result justies the existence and the recent increasing
demand for instruments such as indexed bonds aimed at hedging a real source of risk such
as ination. Also, our ndings on the role of information asymmetries are in line with
the existing empirical literature. As in Warnock (2002) and Ahearne et al. (2004), we
nd evidence of the important role for information asymmetries in determining bilateral
bias in the US portfolio. The same results are conrmed for a wider set of large investing
countries in the CPIS pooled dataset. Trade ows and development of nancial market
turn out to be the proxies better capturing informational e¢ ciency. These results suggest
that emerging markets, such as China and India, should succeed in lowering the informa-
tional barriers through strong trade linkages and sharp growth in stock market shares, as
to attract an increasing international demand and allowing diversication opportunities
not yet fully exploited.
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A Technical Appendix: bilateral cost/e¢ ciency functions
The functional expressions for the average information e¢ ciency  and the D 1l are the
following
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where
1
Dlj
represents the deviation of investor l from the world average information
e¢ ciency. It is equal to 1 if the investor has a composite information costsstructure equal
to the average: in this case investor l will hold the same logarithm portfolio as the average
one. The share related to the hedge portfolio is, instead, proportional to the absolute level
of total cost the investor has to face to hold this stock. It can also be noted as the highest
information e¢ ciency is of course for investor l investing domestically and it determines,
ceteris paribus, a higher portfolio share in home assets.
In terms of econometric implementation, we use proxies capturing the reciprocal of
information cost, i.e. information e¢ ciency. Therefore, we dene a variable lj capturing
1
clj
or, if we use the inward-outward information decomposition, two variables l and j
capturing
1
cl
and
1
cj
, respectively28.
By simple substitution, considering the two possible ways (additive or multiplicative)
of dening Clj and, consequently, Dlj , we obtain for the additive cost function specication
28 In the case of investor l holding domestic assets cll = 0 =) ll =1 and
ll
1 + ll
 ! 1:
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and for the multiplicative cost function specication
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We use the proxies mentioned in the text ("size" and "trade" variables) in order to
estimate l and j . The transformation allows to normalize to zero the information
costs relative to home holdings (cll = 0) Cll = (1 + cll) = 1) therefore
1
Cll
= 1 and
1
Dll
= 10@PL
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It can be noticed that 0 <
lj
1 + lj
 1 and lj
1 + lj
is an increasing function of lj : the
higher lj (the lower clj , the information cost) the higher the share of the corresponding
stock j in portfolio l:
In our estimable equation (16)
ACSlj;t = a0 + 1MSj;t + 2blj;t + 3prlj;t + 4r_prlj;t ++lj;t
prlj is the "absolute e¢ ciency proxy" and captures
1
Clj
while r_prlj is the "relative
e¢ ciency proxy" and captures
1
Dlj
:
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The normalization of information costs has been induced by the need of dening infor-
mation costs related to domestic investment. Since it is not possible to size, for instance,
the degree of openness of country k to country k itself, we have been forced to set an
upper bound to information e¢ ciency (represented by domestic investments, normalized
to 1) and scale the other proxies accordingly. The normalization procedure, anyway, has
the notable advantage of making all proxies, potentially di¤erent in magnitude, directly
comparable and the relative size of their coe¢ cients easily interpretable.
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